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Underway for quite some time now has been the discussion on using public procurement as a 
means to stimulate innovation. However - with some exceptions this has been mainly a conceptual 
discussion vastly surpassed a corresponding development of appropriate monitoring tools. Also, 
even if both qualitative and quantitative studies have been made, they tend to lack connection to 
the underlying mechanisms envisaged in the conceptual and/or case based literature. A challenge 
in this endeavour prevails in the nature of how public procurement of innovation works. Some of 
the effects rendered may not always manifest in ways that are easily quantified  on aggregate 
levels. Other effects may emerge over time, as results of multi-causal effects, which may yet 
further impose measuring difficulties. Yet a further challenge consists of the uncertainties 
regarding to what extent the sometimes bold claims about the usefulness of public procurement 
of innovation are at all realistic and feasible in practice. After reviewing different currently 
available means to measure both public procurement of innovation measures, as well as public 
procurement of innovation, the paper outlines a case-based approach to measure public 
procurement of innovation. 
Introduction 
Since the Millennium Shift the idea that public procurement can be used as a way to stimulate 
demand has increasingly gained attention among policy makers. The most prominent protagonists 
in this policy development have been European policy makers and academics. For Europe public 
procurement of innovation has been identified as a central tool in the general ambition to 
promote demand-side policies in order to boost innovation in order to sustain competitive 
advantage in a global economy. But through the years this interest has emerged and evolved in 
more or less the whole world (OECD, 2011; UNOPS, 2014), even if the amount of efforts spent by 
national governments might vary between different countries (Lember et al ., 2014). The 
development of policy has however vastly surpassed a corresponding development of appropriate 
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monitoring tools and “there is today no systemic unified mechanism to track the total amount of 
R&D procured by public entities in Europe, and even less information is available about the share 
of ICT-related R&D procurement” (European Union, 2014, p. 3). Similarly, OECD notes that “there 
is very limited evidence on what share of governments’ procurement budgets are dedicated to the 
development or adoption of new goods and services, let alone what is the overall impact of those 
purchasing decisions. This evidence gap is particularly relevant at a time in which several countries 
are considering the introduction of targets and complementary policies to promote the use of 
procurement as an innovation policy tool.” (Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2014, p. 3.). In other 
words, even if both qualitative and quantitative studies have been made both in the past and 
more recently that supports the general claim that public procurement can indeed generate 
demand for innovation, measurement concerning the link between policy and realised public 
procurement of innovation is in principle a completely unexplored area.   
The purpose with this paper is therefore to explore the possibilities for measuring the effects of 
public procurement of innovation and based on such an analysis develop a set of indicators to be 
used for monitoring public procurement of innovation outcomes. The research question 
addressed is formulated as follows. How can the effects of public procurement of inn ovation be 
measured? 
Potential ways of measuring public procurement of innovation 
An initial issue to settle is how innovation should be understood, which might not necessarily be a 
straightforward task. As a useful starting point would nevertheless be to incorporate any kinds of 
Schumpeterian innovations i.e. new combinations manifested as the introduction of a new good, a 
new method of production, the opening up of a new market, or the use of a new source of supply 
of raw materials or new ways of organising industries (Schumpeter, 1934). Kotsemir and Abroskin 
(2013) note that the notion of innovation over the years has been incorporated in many different 
contexts outside scientific realms, in policy, marketing, used as a metaphor, slogan or buzzword, 
resulting also in great variation of its use. This might create some problems. One possibility is to 
define innovation in relation to the local context, i.e. with reference to the Oslo manual, and thus 
distinguish between innovations new to the firm, not new to the firm, new to the public authority 
and not new to the public authority (Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2014). Studying public innovation 
in general, Kattel et al. (2013) make the point that public innovation might not follow the same 
evolutionary mechanisms as would private firms. Rather, in order to understand public innovation 
“we should try to focus on evolutionary processes within public sector that originate from logics of 
public sector and pertain to such phenomena as power, legitimacy, trust, etc.” (Kattel et al., 2013, 
p. 7). Drawing on interviews with representatives from public agencies, Bloch and Bugge (2012) 
define four relevant and adequately covers the types of innovation that applies to in the public 




There is a range of thinkable ways of measuring public procurement of innovation which 
essentially can be populated in a quantitative- qualitative spectrum.  To the quantitative end 
belong surveys like different types of innovation scoreboards, which apply different types of 
indicators. Indicators used by the Innovation Union Scoreboard fall into three broad categories, 
enablers, firm activities and outputs (Adam, 2014). Indicators under the enablers concerns human 
resources, e.g. the number of doctorate graduates in relation to the whole population,  or other 
measures of education levels. Other indicators rely on publication performance and e.g. R%D 
expenditure. Firm activities gather information about R&D expenditure in the business sector or 
the degree to which different IPR schemes are utilised such as patents or trademarks. Under the 
outcomes category are information gathered that concerns medium of high-tech exports or 
employment in knowledge-intensive sectors. A major problem with these types of measuring is 
that “…quantification and use of sophisticated statistical  methods and mathematical models in 
itself and a priori do not enable the attainment of scientifically relevant insights. These methods 
and models are useful as research tools, yet they cannot be taken as a sufficient and necessary 
basis for the production of valid empirical evidence and a theoretically relevant interpretation of 
this evidence. They cannot be applied in a routine and simple way and cannot be a substitute for 
theoretical elaboration. The social sciences need a more integrated and deliberative 
methodological approach.” (Adam, 2014, p. 6). 
Another form of quantitative surveys relies on indicators developed by using input from experts. 
One example is the global competitiveness report issues by the World Economic Forum w 
(Schwab, 2014). Out of a range of different things this survey asks national experts, to what extent  
government purchasing decisions foster innovation. The outcome is a ranking list ordering the 144 
countries included in the survey based on the responses. Another example of a survey relying on 
collected opinions focusing in public procurement specifically is Uyarra et al., (2014) which 
identifies lack of interaction with procuring organisations, over-specification (as opposed to the 
use of outcome-based specification) and poor management of risk, as the main barriers 
preventing public procurement of innovation. The latter, one could argue, is more adequate as the 
sample used consisted of responses from managers and leaders in firms with a substantial track-
record as public suppliers. What neither of these studies can provide information about is to what 
extent the result draws on prejudice or actual experience; or to what extent a single bad 
experience is given un-proportional weight. In Adam’s analysis of quantitative studies these 
problems generates a debate about positivism, and the current preference for quantitative 
research, where qualitative approaches are discarded as ‘anecdotal’ or ‘unstructured’. “Positivism 
somehow presupposes that data are good quality and adequate if they can be quantified, and 
bypasses the problem of context by dealing with the multitude of variables and correlations 
between them.” (Adam, 2014, p. 6). 
Trochim, writing about evaluation policy, uses the notion substantive policy to be understood  as 
those policies that “get translated into operational objects and practices” (Trochim, 2009, p. 15). 
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One such substantive policy for public procurement of innovation are the Millenium goals that 
were set for the EU to increase its R&D investments to raise from 1.9% of EU GDP in 2000 to 3% of 
EU GDP in 2010, in order to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world. A few years later, the connection to public procurement was made explicit, 
as public procurement could provide the necessary demand for R&D and innovation (Rolfstam, 
2009). Trochim (2009) then turns to the programs, ‘operational objects and practices’ emerging 
from the substantive policies. For public procurement of innovation there are quite a few such 
examples, for instance the lead market initiative, or the development of pre-commercial 
procurement (PCP). For lead market initiative public procurement of innovation was given a 
central role emphasising the importance of “[m]obilizing public authorities to act as ‘launching 
customers‘ by promoting the use of [public procurement] practices supportive for innovation…” 
(European Commission, 2007a, p. 7). Pre-commercial procurement (PCP) was introduced as an 
“approach to procuring R&D services” (European Commission, 2007b), aiming specifically to bridge 
the gap between scientific knowledge and the market through application of public demand -pull. 
Interestingly, Trochims (2009) interests concern evaluation of operational objects, practices and 
programs that come out of the substantive policies, not the substantive policies themsel ves. The 
implicit evaluation and measurement objective exists in this perspective in the relation between 
the substantive policies and lower operational levels, without taking into account whether or not 
the substantive policies are valid. For the purpose here, it should be noted that the literature 
offers examples of attempts that could be considered to make judgements to what extent the 
substantive policies underscoring the use of public procurement of innovation . Examples of such 
more recent quantitative studies have compared different innovation effects suggesting public 
procurement and university spillovers to be more important than other measures such as 
regulation and public funding of innovation projects (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009). Similar results 
have been found by drawing on data collected from EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland 
(Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2012).  These authors however also find that biggest impact is achieved with 
policies considering the simultaneous application of R&D subsidies and public procurement. There 
is also a range of case studies reporting on how public procurement has helped to stimulate 
innovation (c.f. Rolfstam, 2013).  The problem with these studies, from an evaluation perspective 
is however, that they scrutinize real occurring phenomena as they happened, without much 
attention given to the role of policy and to what extent policy could actually help to stimulate  new 
occurrences of, what in these studies tends to be spontaneous instances. In other words, although 
these studies warrants the conclusion that public procurement may create demand for innovation, 
they do not provide sufficient evidence for the general claim that public procurement of 
innovation policy do.   
One approach to measuring public procurement of innovation policy understood as operational 
objects, practices and programs, is different attempts to benchmark the level of national 
implementation of concrete programs as responses to EU policy. For instance, based on a surveys 
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distributed to national representatives from the EU Member States and Associated Countries, the 
European Commission tried to benchmark the extent to which pre-commercial procurement (PCP) 
was implemented. One of the outcomes was a display in which countries were grouped into four 
categories; Awareness Raising/ Exploring Possibilities, Working on framework, Framework 
identified, pilots started (Bos, 2011). Drawing mainly on secondary data, Izsak and Edler (2011) 
conducts a similar exercise addressing the implementation of demand-side policies. Also here 
countries are grouped into categories depending on their relative performance in terms of policy 
implementation. These categories are ‘Strong policy discourse and experience’, ‘Relevant policy 
discourse and experimentation’, ‘Limited policy discourse and/or action’. Maybe a comment to the 
accuracy of these kinds of desk studies, or at least a side-remark in general would be that the 
corroborative evidence putting Denmark into the for-runner category ‘Strong policy discourse and 
experience’ is its implementation of public-private partnerships. This is indeed a very established 
set-up in the Danish context, but characterized in particular for its lack of demand aggregation, as 
these projects to large extents involve learning and pre-commercial testing of supplier-side 
innovation typically not leading to a commercial procurement (Rolfstam and Petersen, 2014). This 
means that this instrument could hardly be used as indicator of well -developed demand-side 
innovation instruments.  
The point to make here is not to degrade these benchmark studies. They are certainly useful, in 
particular to create incentives for increasing efforts among currently ‘underperforming’ domains. 
It is nevertheless important to be aware of the challenges such studies always have to live with. 
“Researching performance information is difficult because the concept may refer to very different 
realities across organizations. Using very narrow conceptions of performance information, 
however, forces researchers to analyse organizations that are very similar, or that operate in a 
single jurisdiction” (Hammerschmid et al., 2013, p. 262). Thus, one generic limitation these kinds 
of surveys suffer from is translation problems, i.e. uncertainty when national respondents try to fit 
into an internationally surveys, incompatible elements of their local  contexts. There is also a 
possibility that alternative but functional approaches developed in a specific endogenous context 
may reduce the score for a certain country, only because the particular approach is not regarded 
in the survey. Furthermore, even if these surveys would provide an adequate account of the 
current policy development, they tend to say little about the actual outcome, i.e. if the measures 
takes actually render innovation. 
Towards an alternative approach to measuring public procurement of innovation 
It has been proposed that public procurement of innovation should be understood as a 
phenomenon that requires a multilevel institutional analysis (Rolfstam, 2012; 2013). For Europe, 
the main policy drivers as well as legislative authority prevails on the European level. The 
substantive policies are developed as European innovation policy. EU Member states also have to 
transpose into national law the legislative framework in the form of the EU Directives on public 
procurement. Such implementation follows the subsidiarity principle which means that the way 
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the directives are implemented is determined by each national legal authority. So, even if the 
Directives should be implemented national-specific differences may exist. The same goes with 
policy implementation. Then there are other levels, in particular public agencies or even public 
procurement units (to the extent there exist such units) and the level of practice, that each may 
determine what kind of public procurement behaviour actually manifested in practice. These are 
all elements that make policy making as well as measuring the effects somewhat complex. “In 
complex organizations or systems it is likely that policy making will itself be a hierarchical process 
with different levels of the hierarchical organization developing different levels of policy. High-
level policies (outer circles) would be specified at the highest level of the organization, and 
responsibility would be delegated to subunits that inherit with those policies the responsibility for 
determining more detailed policies and ultimately evaluation practice.” (Trochim, 2009, p. 26.). In 
some situations public procurement may not be the most commonly used tool for public sector 
innovation in general. Following a study of public innovation (i.e. not only innovation generated 
with public procurement) in the Nordic countries, the most common way of innovating was in -
house development (Bugge et al., 2011).  
The general point to make is that reality is complex and context specific, which creates challenges 
when it comes to policy making as well as measuring. It is this reality the different measuring 
approaches reviewed above struggle with. Also, it is very hard to forecast when public 
procurement of innovation takes place. It is often the resultant of different factors such as 
endogenous demand, availability of technology, funding and an array other resources. There are 
also situations where it would make little sense for a public actor to engage in public procurement 
of innovation at all. A large investment in new technology may not typically occur every year in a 
particular context, but will be followed by a “lull” where spending activities may be limited to 
operations and possibly incremental improvements. A new public procurement of innovation 
project will not become relevant until the end of the life-cycle of the old technology. These lulls 
captured in a survey that collects data on public procurement of innovation without taking into 
account context will reduce the scores for the particular context, although it might in reality be an 
effect of perfectly adequate procurement behaviour. 
The measuring approach proposed here is therefore based on actual cases, and the elements to 
be measured should be connected to what extent these enabled or hindered the success of a 
specific project. A central construct in this sense is the public procurement of innovation system. It 
has been proposed that a procurement system is good or sound if two conditions are satisfied 
(OECD, 2012) 
• Existence of decision centres setting possible multiple and non -contradictory objectives, and 
periodically assessing whether the system works coherently with those objectives.  
• The system is built on a set of processes that maximize the likelihood of reaching the system’s 
objectives while minimizing the use of resources. 
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The essential aim would thus be to evaluate how this system performs in a given public 
procurement of innovation project. Examples of entities included in a procurement system for a 
country would be public agencies involved in monitoring procurement activity and international 
developments in law or in best practice; the court system, and public procurement departments 
on different levels and sectors; and public agencies responsible for a policy domain where public 
procurement is envisaged as a useful tool for policy implementation. Viewed in the framework 
applied here becomes public procurement a system where achieving value for money in 
procurement processes is not the only aspect that should be considered in evaluations.  To the 
extent a certain public procurement system is performing according to set expectations relates 
both to efficiency and to other policies or strategies that might go beyond mere efficiency. 
This public procurement system should however not be defined in an absolute way but in relation 
to the specific context. If a specific (attempted) public procurement of innovation project occurs in 
a municipality setting, the components to be measures concerns probably primarily the 
interaction that takes place with municipality procurers and suppliers and stakeholders located in 
the neighbourhood. Another project may take place as a cross-border procurement project 
drawing on different international funding sources, and requires a corresponding development of 
variables to be measured. Then, tentatively, it would be possible to aggregate data based on cases 
occurring on different institutional levels, and thereby capture also an aggregated view. 
What would be used as an argument in favour for such a measurement set-up is that there 
appears to be an institutional explanation for success in public procurement of innovation and 
that many of the determinants rendering success prevail on lower institutional levels (Rolfstam, 
2013; table 1). These could be used as a theoretical case to compare actual outcomes with. For 
instance, public procurers need to possess skills related to the procurement procedures and 
procurement law, the ability to make technical specifications, and general management skills. It 
usually requires a significant level of tacit knowledge and experience to apply the rules in the 
specific context. Technical competence for specification refers to the ability to know and 
formulate what is to be procured preferably in such a way that also solutions the procurer was not 
initially aware of are allowed to be submitted. Cooperative PPI in turn raises a need for skills able 
to coordinate and negotiate demands stemming from different collaborating rationalities. The 
need for skill-upgrading came also forward in a recent Swedish public inquiry that concluded that 
the negligence of using public procurement as an innovation policy tool could partly be explained 
by the lack of available academic education on the topic (SOU, 2013). 
Table 1: Success factors and to what extent they are within range of public procurement 
training. Adopted from Rolfstam (2013) 
Success-factor Description 
Expertise on public procurement procedures 
and public procurement law 
Understanding how to apply procurement procedures, award criteria 
and other activities regulated by law. 
Technical competence for specification Possess sufficient competence to know what to procure. 
Coordination for co-operative procurement Coordinate demand in projects with several customers. 
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General project management skills The ability to coordinate information, stick to agreed plans and meet 
deadlines. 
Allocation of Resources Non-routine allocation of resources necessary for time-consuming 
search and for setting-up and manage projects. 
Political Support Support from political leadership. 
Commitment from other institutional actors  Support not only from contractors but also other stakeholders affected 
by the project outcome. 
Appreciation and understanding of the 
procurement rules 
Supplier understanding of the peculiarities associated with dealing with 
a public customer. 
Technology Champions The availability of a person or a group of persons who champions the 
introduction and diffusion of the procured item. 
 
Some of these success factors, for instance skills for specifications as well as management skills are 
controllable in the sense that they can either be developed by individuals or be allocated to a 
project by appropriate recruitment. Some success-factors are however external to the actual 
procurement context. Sometimes success depends on commitments from actors other than those 
formally included in the contract, e.g. future users, operators and suppliers to the procured 
system once in operation. Achieving such commitment is partly controllable if the procurer 
manages the project well, but the decision to become committed prevails with the external 
stakeholder. Other success-factors are political support and the allocation of resources, which 
underline that also other categories of staff within the public sector should be considered as 
potential targets for skill upgrading in PPI. Two final and sometimes neglected success-factors are 
the appreciation of the procurement rules in general and the roles of technology champions. The 
former stresses that not only the procurer’s side needs to appreciate the peculiarities of public 
procurement; also suppliers need to possess the knowledge and skills required to do business with 
a public client and understand relevant rules and procedures. The latter stresses that uptake and 
actual use of a procured innovation may require e.g. user training and promotion initiatives made, 
for instance initiated by technology champions.  
By applying the approach described above, i.e. by taking as starting point the actual occurrence of 
cases, would take into account endogenous contexts. It would also capture problems to the extent 
they actually evolved. Thinkable variables could correspond to the success factors listed in table 1, 
i.e. what the Expertise on public procurement procedures and public procurement law sufficient 
for the given situation; was there sufficient technical competence; to the extent required, did 
procurers master the coordination etc. The outcome of such evaluation would then be context 
specific, and probably make more sense than an international survey based on national experts 
stating to what degree a country applied public procurement of innovation in practice.   
References 
Adam, F. (2014). Measuring National Innovation Performance: The Innovation Union Scoreboard 
Revisited. Springer: Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London. 
9 
 
Appelt, S. and Galindo-Rueda, F. (2014). Measuring the link between public procurement and 
innovation. OECD/ Working Party of National Experts on Science and Technology Indicators.  
Aschhoff, B. and Sofka, W. (2009). Innovation on demand: can public procurement drive market 
success of innovations? Research Policy, 38, 1235–47. 
Bloch, C. and Bugge, M. M. (2012). How to measure innovation in the public sector? Innovation 
indicators in the public context. 1st International EIBURS-TAIPS TAIPS conference on: “Innovation 
in the public sector and the developments of e-services. University of Urbino, 19-20 April.  
Bos, L. (2011). Compilation of results of the EC survey on the status of implementation of pre-
commercial procurement across Europe. Executive summary of the survey. APRIL 2011 
Bugge, M. M., Mortensen, P. S., Bloch, C. (2011). Measuring Public Innovation in Nordic Countries. 
Report on the Nordic Pilot studies – Analyses of methodology and results. NIFU Rapport 40/2011. 
European Commission (2007a). A lead market initiative for Europe. Brussels, 21.12.2007 
COM(2007) 860 final.  
European Commission, (2007b). Pre-commercial procurement: Driving innovation to ensure 
sustainable high quality public services in Europe. Brussels, 14.12.2007 COM 2007:799 final. P. 2. 
European Union(2014). Quantifying public procurement of R&D of ICT solutions in Europe. SMART 
2011/0036. 
Guerzoni, M., & Raiteri, E. (2014). Demand-side vs. supply-side technology policies: Hidden 
treatment and new empirical evidence on the policy mix. Research Policy.  
Hammerschmid, G., Van de Walle, S. and Stimac, V. (2013). Internal and external use of 
performance information in public organizations: results from an international survey. Public 
Money & Management. 33:4, 261-268. 
Izsak, K. and Edler, J. (2011). Trends and Challenges in Demand-Side Innovation Policies in Europe.  
Thematic Report 2011 under Specific Contract for the Integration of INNO Policy TrendChart with 
ERAWATCH (2011-2012) Contract number x07. Technopolis group. 
Kattel, R., Cepilovs, A., Drechsler, W., Kalvet, T., Lember, V. and Tõnurist, P. (2013). Can we 
measure public sector innovation? A literature review. Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and 
Governance, Tallinn, Estonia, 1-9-2013. Version 0.1, preliminary draft, to be presented at EGPA 
2013 conference 
Kotsemir, M. and Abroskin, A. (2013). Innovation Concepts And Typology – An Evolutionary 
Discussion. Basic Research Program Working Papers Series: Science, Technology and Innovation, 
Wp Brp 05/Sti/2013. 
10 
 
Lember V., Kattel, R. and Kalvet, T. (2014). (Eds). Public procurement for innovation policy: 
International perspectives. Springer Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London. 
OECD (2011). Demand-side Innovation Policies, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264098886-en (Accessed 2011-12-08). 
OECD (2012). Discussion paper on public procurement performance measures. 11-12 February, 
Paris, OECD Conference Centre.  
Rolfstam, M. (2009). Public Procurement as an Innovation Policy Tool: the Role of Institutions. 
Science and Public Policy, 36(5), 349–360 June. 
Rolfstam, M. (2013). Public Procurement and Innovation: The role of institutions. Edward Elgar. 
Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA. 
Rolfstam, M. and Helby Petersen, O., (2014). Public Procurement of Innovation Policy: The Case of 
Denmark. In Veiko Lember, Rainer Kattel and Tarmo Kalvet (Eds) Public procurement, innovation 
and policy: International perspectives. Springer Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London. Pp. 
109-126. 
Schumpeter, J. (1934). The theory of economic development. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Schwab, K. (2014). (Ed)  The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015. Full Data Edition. World 
Economic Forum. 
SOU (2013). Goda affärer – en strategi för hållbar offentlig upphandling, Statens offentliga 
utredningar SOU 2013:12. Fritze, Stockholm 
Trochim, W.M.K. (2009). Evaluation policy and evaluation practice. In W.M.K. Trochim, M. M. 
Mark, & L. J. Cooksy (Eds.), Evaluation policy and evaluation practice. New Directions for 
Evaluation, 123, 13–32. 
UNOPS, (2014). Procurement and innovation. Supplement to the 2013 Annual Statistical Report on 
United Nations Procurement. Pp. 23-26. 
